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C.: Deeds--Construction--Where Not Effective until the Future

REGENT CASE COMMENTS

stances of contempt. 21 The Smith case could have been based partly on the fact that this statute 2 was intended by the legislature to
be applicable to both law courts and chancery tribunals.28
Since the conclusion reached by the instant case is that the
order should be entered upon the law docket in order to conform
to the well-established procedural precedents, in view of the fact
that the recent tendency seems to be away from those precedents,
it would seem that the court should have gone further and held
that the entry on the chancery side of the order imposing punishment was not error.
W. H. S.
DEEDS -

CONSTRUCTION -
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NOT

mFECT
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FUTURE. - In consideration of love and affection and one dollar, X
and her husband executed an instrument, without warranty, granting to their children in fee a tract of land. The instrument contained the clause, "this grant does not take effect until the death
of the said Mary E. Queen. . . .", and was promptly recorded.
Held, that the instrument will be construed as a deed vesting in
the Orantee an immediate estate though its enjoyment is postponed
until the grantor's death. Liggett v. Rotr.1
In the early English case of Adams v. Savage2 it was held that
a use limited after-an estate for years to a person not in esse was
bad as a contingent remainder unsupported by a freehold. This
type of estate was impossible at common law because there was no
one to take the seisin at the time of the conveyance.8 But, by way
4
of a use, a freehold could be granted to commence in the future.
Later English cases' hold that a future contingent devise after
an estate for years is a good executory devise and not a bad remainder. As there is no intelligible difference between a springing
executory devise and a spr;inging use, if the above estate were
created by deed it would be a valid springing use in England today21W. VA. Rv. CODE (1931) c. 61, art. 5, §§ 26-27.
22 W. VA. CODE (Hogg, 1913) e. 147, § 27.
23 Hallam v. Alpha Coal Co., 9 S. E. (2d) 818 (W. Va. 1940).
17 S. E. (2d) 867 (W. Va. 1940).
2 2 Ld. Raym. 854, 92 Eng. Rep. R.

71 (1703).
a Adams v. Savage, 2 Ld. Raym. 854, 92 Eng. Rep. R. 71 (1703) ; Rawley v.
Holland, 22 Vin. Abr. 189, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 753, 22 Eng. Rep. B. 638 (1712).
4 GRAY, Rums AGAINST PERPETurriEs (3d ead. 1915) 54.
5 Gore v. Gore, 2 P. Wims. 28, 24 Eng. Rep. R. 629 (1722) ; Harris v. Barnes,
4 Burr. 2157, 98 Eng. Rep. B. 125 (1768).
6 GRAY, RuLE AGAINsT PERPETUITIES 54.
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Today in West Virginia our statute expressly covers this situation by providing, "Any estate in such property may be made to
commence in futuro, by conveyance inter vivos, in like manner as
by will, and any estate which would be good as an executory devise or bequest, shall be good if created by conveyance inter
vivos.

"7

The express purpose of this statute was to make spring-

ing uses valid if created by deed." Due to this any springing use,
freehold or less, is a valid conveyance inter vivos today in West Vir9
ginia.
In determining whether an instrument is testamentary or not,
the courts do not allow language peculiar to either deeds or wills,
or the belief of the maker as to the character of the instrument, or
the name given to it by them, to control inflexibly its construction. 10
Giving due weight to these circumstances, the courts look further
and, weighing all the circumstances surrounding the parties and attending the execution of the instrument, give it such construction
as will effectuate the manifest intention of the maker." That the
instrument is delivered, acknowledged, recorded, or not witnessed,
or any of these is evidence, though not decisive, that a deed was
intended.'12
Literally the provision that the instrument should
not take effect until the maker's death sounds testamentary. This
language is suggestive of the ambulatory concept of a will and in
it may lurk the idea that it is revocable by the maker. 1 3

M!ost

courts give these instruments the liberal construction of immediately passing the fee subject to a life estate in the maker.14 This
seems a reasonable interpretation when the other language of the
instrument contains words of present grant. The words of present
grant are not to be paralyzed by the clause deferring enjoyment of
the estate, when we can assign to it a reasonable function and give
each clause its fair relative meaning, when laid by the side of the
other clauses.'15 'When the grantor reserves the right of revocation
7 W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 36, art. 1, § 9.
8 See GRAY, RULE AGA NST PEEETUITIES §§ 58-60, as to reason for the
adoption of this provision in VA. CODE (1819).
9 See Abbott v. Holway, 72 Me. 298 (1881) where the Maine court without
a statute held valid a contingent springing estate to the survivor.
10 Pass v. Stephens, 22 Ariz. 461, 198 Pac. 712 (1921); Lauck v. Logan, 45
W. Va. 251, 31 S. E. 986 (1898).
- Seay v. Huggins, 194 Ala. 496, 70 So. 113 (1915) ; Trumbauer v. Rust, 36
S. D. 301, 154 N. W. 801 (1915).
12 Seay v. Huggins, 194 Ala. 496, 70 So. 113 (1915); Lauck v. Logan, 45
W. Va. 251, 31 S.B. 986 (1898).
'1ATxiNSON oN WmLs (1937) 145.
14 Lauck v. Logan, 45 W. Va. 251, 31 S.E. 986 (1898) ; Rust v. Commercial
Coal & Coke Co., 92 W. Va. 457, 115 S.E. 406 (1922).
15 Lauck v. Logan, 45 W. Va. 251, 31 S.E. 986 (1898).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol47/iss2/12

2

C.: Deeds--Construction--Where Not Effective until the Future
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
in an instrument in the form of a deed, the instrument is properly
held to be testamentary, and invalid as not executed as a will.1
Since looking at all the facts, there were irrevocable delivery,
recordation, and lack of witnesses, it seems that the instrument in
the present case was properly held to be a deed. The case is
analogous to the quasi-escrow transaction wherein th6 grantor delivers the deed to a third person with the instruction to give it to
the grantee on the grantor's death. 7 This is deemed to pass the
fee to the grantee at once subject to a life estate reserved by implication in the grantor. 8
The case is close and appears to be sound. On the other hand,
if there had been any evidence of the intent of the grantor to -reserve a power of revocation over this alleged conveyance, the result
should have been otherwise, as the instrument would have been
testamentary.
w. J. C.
LANDLORD AND TENANT - TERMINATION OF A YEAR TO YEAR
TENANcY. - D (county court) leased a farm from P for a pauper
family. The family held over after the expiration of the one-year
term, and D continued to pay rent for a year and a half, at which
time D entered a general order that it would no longer be responsible for the support of paupers. The clerk of the court called this
order to P's attention, but no other notice was given as to the
termination of the tenancy. Held,that a tenancy from year to year
may be terminated only in the way prescribed by the statute.'
Deitz v. County Court of Nicholas County
At common law to terminate a year to year tenancy a sixcalendar-months parol notice, expiring always with the same year
as the tenancy, was adequate8 By agreement of the parties the
16 Roberts v. Coleman, 37 W. Va. 143, 16 S. E. 482 (1892); Spangler V.
Vermillion, 80 W. Va. 75, 92 S. E. 457 (1917).
17 Thurston v. Tubbs, 257 IlM. 465, 100 N. E. 947 (1913) ; Noah v. Noah, 246
Mich. 324, 224 N. W. 611 (1929).
18 Wilson v. Jones, 280 Mass. 488, 182 S. E. 917 (1932) ; Noah v. Noah, 246
Mich. 324, 224 N. W. 611 (1929).

1W.VA. CoDn (Michie, 1937) c. 37, art. 6, § 5: "A tenancy from year to
year may be terminated by either party giving notice in writing to the other, at
least three months prior to the end of any year, of his intention to terminate
the same." The remainder of the section deals with the termination of periodic
tenancies of less than a year, service of the notice, and manner of contracting

out of the statute.
2 8 S. E. (2d) 884 (1940).
8 2 M on's IxsruTEs (4th ed. 1892) 201.
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